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of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
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A ppellaflltt, 
-vs.-
KELLOGG SALES COMPANY, 
Respotr~Aaoot. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 7824 
Appeal from the District Court of Salt Lake County, 
Utah, Clarence E. Baker, Judge 
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IN THE SUPREME c.OURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
R. ~f. SCOVILLE, 
Appellant, 
-vs.-
KELLOGG SALES COMPANY, 
Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 7824 
STATEMEN·T OF THE CA'SE 
· This .is an action on a contract seeking. to recover 
certain bonus payments claimed by the app·ellant for the 
year 1949 while the appellant was employed by respond-
ent. The case was tried in the District Court of Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah. Trial was before a Judge 
and jury. The trial Judge granted certain of the respond-
ent's motions to strike certain testimony on the ground 
that it violates the Parol Evidence Rule (R. 87), and 
certain other testimony on the ground that the witness, 
Leslie Carl Borsum had no authority to bind the Kel-
logg Sales Company (R. 87). The trial Judge then di-
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rected a verdict and judgment was entered thereon on the 
8th day of February, 1952 (R. 93). Notice of appeal was 
filed March 5, 1952 (R.· · 94). Designation of record on 
·appeal was filed ~arch 5, 1952 (R. 95) ,' and an order 
extending the time for filing the record on appeal to the 
21st day of Ap·ril, 1952 was entered on the 11th day of 
April, 1952 (R. 97). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant, Mr. R. M. Scoville, · 65 years of· age 
in April 1952 (R. 13), of Salt Lake City, Utah, was em~ · 
ployed by the respondent, Kellogg Sales Company, as a 
salesman and serviceman on August 15, 1944 (R. 13) . 
. For convenience and clarity the appellant will herein-
after be referred to as Mr. Scoville and the respondent 
will hereinafter be referred to as the Company. At that 
time his territory included the State of Nebraska and 
Kansas (R. 13). In July of 1946 Mr. Scoville was trans-
ferred to Battle Creek, Michigan (R. 13) where he con-
ducted fur feed -business for the. Company .. In March· 
of 1947_ Mr. Scoville was transferred to the western 
~ territory for the purpose. of conducting fur feed_ business 
for the Company (R. 14). This territory consisted of 
that ·area from Denver to the west coast of the United 
States (R. 14). At this time Mr. 'Scoville was paid a 
salar~, given expenses and furnish~d an automobile (R. 
14). In April of 1947, Mrs. Tena Jensen, the Production 
Manager of the Company's Omaha plant, requested Mr. 
Scoville to.undertake to sell turkey feed produced by the 
Companys' plant in Omaha, Nebraska (R.17). 
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The Con1pany sells turkey feed under a plan kilown 
as a turkey finanre progran1 (R. 57). The Company 
furnished nir. Scoville and the dealers with contract 
forn1s (R. 57). Under the terms of this agreement the 
Co1npany agreed to finance the feed for turkeys raised 
by the far1ners. Estimates of the consumers need for 
feed would-be set out in the contract (R. 59). In the fall 
of the year the jobbers handling the feed would have the 
contract forms. The dealers would then get the farmers 
to sign the contracts (R. 58). After these contracts were 
signed by the farmers they were then sent to Mr. Wil-
liams, an employee of the Company (R. 24), at Omaha 
(R. 58). After the contracts were approved by the Com-
pany,.s Omaha office, a copy of the contract was then 
sent to Mr. Scoville (R. 58). The- farmers gene!ally . 
used more than the estimates contained in the contracts 
(R. 59). Of the farmers entering into the contracts, very 
few terminated or cancelled the contracts (R. 59). As 
the turkey growing season progressed the dealer or Mr. 
Scoville would notify. the Omaha plant how much feed to . 
ship at a given time (R. 60). At the time this feed was 
shipped by the Omaha plarit a copy of the invoice was 
sent to Mr. Scoville (R. 60), and from these invoices 
the tonnages were figured by Mr. Scoville ( R. 60) . The 
feed was shipped to. the jobber or sub-dealers and the 
jobber or sub-dealer would then deliver to the farmers 
(R. 59). All of the contracts were written and signed 
by the 1st of July, 1949 (R. 81). The last contract accept-
ed on turkey feed by July 1, 1949 (R. 81). 
During the year 1947, Mr. Scoville sold approxi-
3 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
mately 100 cars of turkey feed, averaging 30 tons per 
car (R. 17). In the last part of January, 1948, Mr. Sco-
ville was advised that he would receive a bonus of $2.00 
a ton on all protein feed sold in the· territory (R. 14). 
This notification consisted of a bulletin which was intro-
duced and admitted (R. 16) as appellant's Exhibit A, 
which is Bulletin 148-3, dated January 29, 1948, and 
initialed by W. H. Williams, Jr., Sales Manager, Mixed 
Feed Department, Omaha Plant (R. 14). For the year 
1948 appellant did not receive any bonus under this ar-
rangement. (R. 18). The reason for not receiving any 
bonus being that Mr. Scoville's expenses had used up 
practically all of his bonus and he was building for an-
other year during the year 1948 (R. 18}. 
During the fall of 1948 the respondent started talk-
ing about the 1949 contracts with the far~ers (R. 20). 
This discussion of the 1949 contracts was started as soon 
as the dressing of the· 1948 turkeys was commenced. 
When the 1949 contracts were sold in the fall of the year 
1948, they wer~ add~d to the next year's business. Con-
tracts for the sale of turkey feed were written from the 
fall of 1948 until June or July of 1949 (R. 20). 
After receip~t of Bulletin 148-3,. appellant's Exhibit 
A, Mr. Scoville worked longe-r hours, worked Saturdays 
and.Sundays (R. 71) and increased the accounts (R. 70) 
and the supply of feed that was shipped to the western 
territory (R. 71). In 1948 when the business became 
quite large, Mrs. Scoville, wife· of the appellant, aCcom-
panied Mr. 'Scoville at all times and kept all the records 
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\vith re~peet to the conduct of the business (R. 76). 
On November 4, 1948, ~lr. Leslie Carl Borsum, Sales 
Manager for the United States for the Company (R. 21) 
and Mrs. Scoville had breakfast together. The conver-
sation 'vhich took place was such that a reasonable infer-
ence could be dra\vn that the bonus plan for 1949 would 
be the same as that for 1948 (R. 23-24, 77-78). 
On April 16, i949, while Mr. Scoville, Mr. L. C. 
Borsum and Mr. W. H. Williams, an employee of the 
Kellogg Sales Company (R. 24), were attending a sales 
meeting (R. 2±) in Omaha, Nebraska, these gentlemen 
and nlrs. Scoville met in Mr. Scoville's hotel room. At 
that til11e there was some conversation about the number 
of contracts for that year, the amount of feed that it 
would take to fill the amount of the contracts, and whether 
or not the Company could make that amount of feed 
(R. 25). This conversation took place before the regular 
sales meeting (R. 25). At this time there was a conversa-
tion from which the only reasonable inference that can 
be drawn is that the 1949 bonus would be computed at 
the same rat-e as the 1948 bonus was computed, i.e~, a 
$2.00 per ton bonus. 
During late July or early August, 1949, at a sales 
meeting in Omaha, Nebraska, Mr. Scoville had a con-
versation with Mr. Borsum from which the only infer .. 
ence that may be drawn is that the bonus of_ $2.00 per 
ton of feed would be paid on the sales made by Mr. Sco-
ville for the year 1949 "(R. 27). 
On July 24, 1949, Mr. Scoville wrote a letter to Mr. 
Borsum (which was admitted as the Company's Exhibit 
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10), from which an inference may be drawn that Mr. 
Borsum had written to Mr. Scoville with respect to a 
bonus. plan for 1949, in which letter Mr. Scoville said he 
could not give his immediate reaction to the proposal 
of. Mr. Borsum in that it might be taken that Mr. Sco-
ville would receive no bonus for 1949. 
On August 2, 1949, Mr. Borsum wrote to Mr. Sco-
ville stating that with reference to a bonus plan for . 
1949, Mr. 'Scoville was practically assured of a bonus, 
and invited Mr. Scoville to attend a sales meeting in 
Omaha, Nebraska on August 8th and 9th, 1949, (this 
letter was admitted in evidence as the Company's ex-
hibit number 11 (R. 65) ) . 
·During the last part o.f July or early part of August, 
Mr. Scoville received a writing which is captioned "Bonus 
Plan for 1949" (and which was admitted as Mr. Scoville's 
Exhibit B) (R. 20) setting out certain figures to be 
paid as a bonus on sales for the year 1949. This was 
the ·first written notice received by Mr. Scoville which 
indicated that the figures to be used by the Company in 
computing the 1949 bonus would be different than that 
used to compute the 1948 bonus (R. 19). Mr. Scoville 
protested several times orally to Mr. Williams and Mr. 
Borsum about the writing which he received as setting 
out figures to be used by the Comp·any in computing the 
1949 bonus (R. 72, R. 28). Mr. Scoville did. not make 
too active a protest about the 1949 writing because he was 
afraid of losing his job. He felt that he was too old a man 
to lose the job and have to go out and hunt for a new 
one (R. 71). 
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On January 9, 1950, ~Ir. Williams, Mr. B·orsum and 
Mr. Seaville attended the Turkey Sho'v in Minneapolis, 
~Iinnesota (R. 28). After Mr. Scoville and Mr. Borsum 
had retired, they had a conyersation during which it was 
said by nir. Borsum that Thlr. Scovil~e would have to 
follo'v the ne'\v schedule of the bonus which was issued 
in .. A.ugust, that if Thlr. Scoville took it up with the higher-
ups, Mr. Borsum, Thlr. Williams and Mr. Scoville would 
all lose their jobs, that if Mr. Scoville would keep his 
mouth shut, Thlr. Scoville could stay on indefinitely as 
long as he was doing the job (R. 29). (Also, R. 71, 
which is not quite as strong.) 
On January 10, 1950, Mr. Williams wrote to Mr. 
Scoville, stating that there would_ be no bonus plan for 
1950, but that Mr. Scoville's wages were raised for the 
year 1950. (Company's Exhibit 3, admitted in evidence -
R. 45). 
On .January 30, 1950, Mr. Williams wrote to Mr. 
Scoville enclosing a check drawn in the sum of $3,544.35, 
in which it was stated that the amount of the bonus was 
based on ~Ir. William's figures, and that such was sub-
ject to . change. (Admitted in evidence as Company's 
Exhibit 6 at R .. 49). On February 10, 1950, Mr. Williams 
wrote to Mr. Scoville acknowledging receipt of the check 
in the sum of $3,544.35, and stated that the Battle Creek 
office had been instructed to forward a check less Mr. 
Scoville's withholding tax. Mr. Williams also stated 
that a corrected check would be sent as soon as Mrs. 
Helen L. Scoville's (R. 49) figures had been audited 
(admitted as the Company's Exhibit 7, R. 50). 
7· 
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On February 3, 1950, while in. Billings, ~1ontana, 
Mr. Scoville became ill (R. 56); he was ·suffering from 
high blood pressure (R. 68). He left Billings, Montana 
and went to Phoenix, Arizona, as prescribed by a doctor 
(R. 68). He remained in Phoenix, Arizona until Aprill, 
1950, (R. 68) at which time he returned. to Utah and his 
employment .CR. 56). 
On ·F.ebruary 6, 1950, a check in the sum of $2,981.92, 
was drawn by the Company .(admitted as the Company's 
Exhibit 4, at R. 54). This check was endorsed by Mr. 
Scoville ( R. 48). 
On April24, 1950,.a -cheek was drawn by the Kellogg 
Sales Company in the sum of $1,026.98, upon a Battle 
Creek, Michigan Bank (admitted as the Company's Ex-
hibit 4, R. 54) which was transmitted by a letter written 
by Mr. Borsum (R. 51) dated Apri125, 1950, which men-
tioned the check (letter admitted as the Company's Ex-
hibit 8, R. 51). This ·check was endorsed by Mr. Scoville 
(R. 48). 
On January 1, 1951, Mr. Scoville was retired from 
the Company (R. 68). Prior to his retirement Mr. Bor-
sum offered Mr. Scoville a position in Ohio, under the 
. terms of which Mr. ScoiVille was required to sell so many 
tons of feed every month to stay in the position, if ·he did 
not make the sales,. he was out of the job (R. 69). On 
December 30, 1950, Mr. S.coville wrote . to Mr. Lyle C . 
. Roll, an employee of the Company, protesting the han-
dling of the bonus for 1949, (letter admitted as the Com-
pany.'s Exhibit 12, R. 67). On January 27, 1951, Mr. Sco-
ville wrote to Mr. Roll, protesting the handling·· of. the 
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1949 bonus, and denying that the signing of the checks 
paid by the Con1pany 'vas an acceptance of settlement 
of his rlain1. (Letter admitted as the Company's Exhibit 
13, R. GS). 
At the close of illr. Scoville's case, the Company, 
through colinsel, renewed its motion to strike the conver-
sations objected to during the trial on the ground that. 
they attempted to yary the terms of the 1948-1949 con- · 
tracts by parol evidence and the Company's motion to 
strike statements made by l\1:r. Borsum on the grou~d 
that his conversations would not bind the C-ompany in 
that he was not.an employee of the Company, but the em-
ployee of a different Company (R. 84-85). The Company 
then moved for a dismissal on a directed verdict (R. 85). 
The court granted the Company's motions to -strike the 
testimony and directed a verdict (R. 87) upon which 
judgment was entered thereon (R. 93). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
PAROL EVIDENCE OF AN ORAL AGREEMENT WHICH 
IS SEPARATE AND APART FROM A PRIOR· WRITTEN 
AGREEMENT OR A_ MODIFICATION OF A PRIOR WRIT-
TEN AGREEMENT MAY BE ADMITTED IN EVIDENCE 
AND THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING SUCH 
PAROL EVIDENCE AS BEING IN VIOLATION OF THE 
PAROL EVIDENCE RULE. 
POINT II 
PAROL EVIDENCE TO PROVE A PRIOR ORAL AGREE-
MENT DIFFERENT IN ITS TERMS 'FROM A PURPORTED 
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WRITTEN AGREEMENT IS ADMISSIBLE AND THE TRIAL 
COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING TESTIMONY ADDUCED 
TO PROVE THE VERBAL AGREEMENT DIFFERENT IN 
ITS TERMS FROM THE PURPORTED WRITTEN AGREE-
MENT, WHICH WAS NEVER ASSENTED TO. 
POINT III 
THE TESTIMONY OF MR .. SCOVILLE WAS TO THE 
EFFECT THAT L. C. BORSUM WAS THE SALES MANAGER 
. FOR THE ENTIRE UNITED STATES OF THE KELLOGG 
SALES COMPANY. CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE 
SAID MR. SCOVILLE AND THE SAID L. C. BORSUM 
TENDED TO ESTABLISH THE RELATIONSHIP OF A 
SALESMAN AND HIS SUPERIOR IN THE SAME ORGANI-
ZATION, AND THE DOCUMENTARY .EVIDENCE INTRO-
DUCED AT TRIAL WAS CONSISTENT WITH AND TENDED 
TO ESTABLISH.THE SAME FACTS AS TESTIFIED TO BY 
MR. SCOVILLE. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN STRIKING 
SUCH TESTIMONY ON THE GROUNDS THAT SUCH WAS 
NOT BINDING UPON THE KELLOGG SALES COMPANY. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT. ERRED IN DIRECTING A VER-
DICT FOR THE COMPANY AFTER WRONGLY EXCLUDING 
TESTIMONY WHICH TENDED TO ESTABLISH THE CASE 
FOR MR. SCOVILLE. 
POINT I 
PAROL EVIDENCE OF AN ORAL.AGREEMENT WHICH 
IS SEPARATE AND APART FROM A PRIOR WRITTEN 
AGREEMENT OR A MODIFICATION OF A PRIOR WRIT-
TEN AGREEMENT MAY BE ADMITTED IN EVIDENCE 
AND THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING SUCH 
PAROL EVIDENCE AS BEING IN VIOLATION OF THE 
PAROL EVIDENCE RULE. 
10 
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On January 29, 1948, the Company put in writing 
a bonus plan for the year 1948, called Bulletin 148-3. · 
This bonus plan was to end, be changed or continue at 
the end of 1948 as per the terms of the writing. On No-
venlber -±, 1948, Mr. Scov.ille entered into a conversatiun 
with l\lr. Borsum from which a reasonable inference 
n1ight be drawn that the same rate would be used in 
determining a 1949 bonus. On April 16, 1949, Mr. Sco-
ville, l\Ir. Borsum, nir. Williams and Mrs .. Scoville had 
a-conversation from which it might be fou?d that the rate 
·used in determining the 1949 bonus would be the same 
as that used in 1948, and which was accepted. The trial 
court granted the Company's motion to strike the testi-:-
mony as to such conversations on the grounds that they 
altered or varied the writt~n bonus plan for 1948. These 
conversations either created a new agreement with re-
spect to the 1949 bonus, modified the 1948 writing ~o in-
clude 1949, or were in complete conformity with the 1948 
Bulletin. 
In January of 1948, Kellogg Sales Company sent out 
a Bulletin numbered 148-3. which was introduce:d at the 
trial as Exhibit A for Mr. Scoville (admitted R. 16) 
which stated as follows: 
Field Servicemen : 
"Bulletin 148-3 
Omaha, Nebraska 
January 29', 1948 
As we discussed in our meeting at Battle 
Creek, the bonus plan for 1948 will be as follows. 
We will credit you~ accoun.t on the basis of $2.00 
per ton allowance on all feed including Sweet Mix 
11 
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Pellets but not including Hominy· Feed, and 
charge' against your account what is paid to you 
in the way of salary, expenses, operation of the 
car and your living expenses, but not including 
automobile depreciation. At the close of 1948 
·whatever amount is over will be paid at the end 
of the year. 
Of course this means that we will look at the 
situation at the end of 1948 and see if this .is the 
best possible bonus arrangemen.t, both from the 
standpoint of the individual salesman and the 
·Kellogg Company. 
W. H .. Williams, Jr. 
Sales Manager 
Mixed Feed Dept. 
Omaha Plant 
WHW:mc 
(s) W. H. W. Jr." 
On N oyember 4, 1948, Mr. Leslie Carl Bors~m, Sales 
Manager for the United ·States for the Company (R. 21), 
Mr. Scoville and Mrs. Helen 'Scoville, had breakfast 
together at Portland, Oregon, while attending the Oregon. 
·Fur Show. Mr. Scoville testified as .follows: 
R. 22: 
Q. ·Will you state, Mr. ~coville, the best you can 
recall what was said by yourself, or Mr. 
Borsum, or by your wife~ 
MR. AADNESEN: Just a minute, a que~stion 
on voir dire. 
VOIR DIRE EX·AMINATION 
BY. MR. AADNESEN: 
Q. Is this conversatio~n purporting to relate to 
any bonus plans~ · 
A. I think it does. 
12 
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::\lR,. _._\~\DNESEN: Your Honor, I object to 
it on the basis it would be parole evidence to 
atte1npt to vary any written contracts whieh 
are not before this court and upon the further 
ground it would be inadn1issible under the 
circun1stances just discussed with you on 
the n1atter it is an attempt to bind Kellogg 
Sales Company by a statement of Kellogg 
Company. 
~lR. CALLISTER: If the court please, it is 
no attempt to vary a written contract, it is an 
attempt to vary one not received until July 
Qr August, 1949. This conversation took place 
the latter part of 1948. 
THE COl'"RT: The objection is overruled. 
Q. (BY niR .. CALLISTER) Do you recall my 
last question, Mr. Scoville~ 
A. What was said at the breakfast table, is that 
correct~ 
Q. That is correct. 
A. Well, I had sent Mr. Borsum a letter on what 
I figured I would do in the year 1949 and he 
asked me if I honestly thought I would sell 
500 cars of feed and I told him the figures 
absolutely showed that way. 
And he said, "That is a lot of feed." 
I said: "I know it, and it is going to mean a 
lot of hard work," and I said: "With the 
bonus figured the way they are now, I am 
also going to make a lot of money, around 
$30,000.00." 
He said he didn't see any reason why the 
bonus should be changed at that time, there 
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was nothing that should be changed in the 
setup for 1949. He also stated the thing he 
would want me to do, when I got my bonus, 
was to buy a home and settle down in it. I 
had been traveling too much. 
He said: "I think if you would spend about 
$4,000.00 for a home it would be adequate 
for you and Helen to live in." (R. 24). 
Mrs. Helen L. Scoville testified with respect to cer-
tain conversations as follows: 
R. 76, 77, 78: 
Q. Mrs. Scoville, you have heard your husband 
testify to a conversation that took place lat.e 
in November or early in December, 1948 at 
the Multnomah Hotel in Portland, Oregon~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Between Mr. Scoville and Mr. Borsum and 
yourself~ 
A. That is right. 
Q. Will you relate what was said at that con-
versation between the parties present~ 
A. Well, I think I can relate -
MR. AADNESEN: Of course my objection 
will be renewed to this, may I request the 
record show any conversations that may be 
brought out, my objection goes to them and 
subject to my motion to strike made hereto ... 
fore, and kept under advisement until argu-
ments~ 
THE COURT: Yes. 
Q. (BY MR. CALLISTER) Will you relate the 
conversation~ 
14 
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.L\. ...\s nearly as I ran rerall, of course, "\Ve had all 
been interested in the two-dollar-per-ton 
bonus berause it meant quite a lot to us. 
This n1orning, under discussion at the break-
fast table, at the Multnomah, between Mr. 
Borsum, ~Ir. Scoville and myself, they were 
talking about tonnage. 
~lr. Scoville told Mr. Borsum the approxi-
mate tonnage for 1949, and it was at this fox 
and mink show, and, of course, our discussion 
on the tonnage was in regard to turkey busi-
ness in this section of the country, and Mr. 
Scoville told ~Ir. Borsum it would be close 
to 500 cars of feed. And Mr. Borsum said: 
''Well, that was an awful lot of feed, and if 
it was possible to sell that much out here, 
Mr. Scoville would certainly be justified in 
having some help." 
~Ir. Scoville said yes he would try to manage 
it alone until late summer or early fall, then 
he would like to have help, and he called at-
tention to the fact -
MR. AADNESEN: I object to it, I think 
counsel should ask questions and have them 
answer. We are getting an extraneous matter 
in here. 
Q. (BY MR. CALLISTER) State who said 
what. 
A. Mr. Scoville said: "Mr. Borsum, this will run 
into quite a lot. of bonus for us, this $2.00 per 
ton." 
MR. AADNE'SEN: I would like a.t this time 
to have questions and answeTs so we can 
make objections if we desire. 
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Q. (BY MR. CALLISTER) What did Mr. Bor-
sum say to that~ 
A. They were interested in the feed business, 
the volume of the feed business, he realized 
we would get quite a bonus out of it, and the 
tonnage had been up to that time 500 cars, 
which would net us about $30,000.00. 
He emphatically stated he would like very 
much for us to find a home somewhere and 
buy it, he thought a $4,000.00 home would be 
adequate for us. (R. 78). 
On April 16, 1949, while Mr. Scoville, Mr. Leslie 
Carl Borsum and Mr. W. H. Williams, an employee of the 
Kellogg S·ales Company, (R. 24) w.ere attending a sales 
meeting (R. 24) in Omaha, Nebraska, these gentlemen 
and Mrs. Scoville met in Mr. Scoville's hotel room. At 
this time a conversation took place about which Mr. Sco-
ville testified as follows: 
R. 25-26: 
Q. And will you state when and where that con-
versation took place, and who was present~ 
A. Well, before the meeting took place Mr. Bor-
sum and Mr. Williams both were in our room 
upstairs, and my wife and myself was there. 
And we talked about the number of contracts 
in and the amount of feed it would take to fill 
the amount of contracts that was in, and 
whether they could make the feed or not at 
that time. 
Q. Mr. Scoville, will you say, as best you can, 
what you said and what any other individual 
said? 
A. Well, I asked -
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1\lR~. ~\ .... \.l)NESEN: Your Honor, on the srune 
baBis as before, one question on voir dire. 
Q. (\'" oir Dire by ~Ir. Aadnesen) Did this con-
versation pertain to anything about 1948 and 
'49 bonus'? 
.A... It 'Yill. 
~IR .. A ... .:\ .. DNESEN: I renew my objection on 
the basis it is an attempt to vary written 
evidence before the Court on parole evidence, 
and on the ground it is an attempt to bind the 
employees of one organization against an-
other. 
THE COl"TRT: Well, the objection is over-
ruled. 
Q. (BY :JIR. CALLISTER) Well, go ahead, Mr. 
Scoville, and relate that conversation and 
designate who said what~ 
A. I asked both ~1r. Borsum and Mr. Williams 
if they thought I had about enough turkey 
contracts in this territory. 
And Mr. Williams stated I should go ahead 
and sell all the contracts I could. He could 
make the feed. He was in charge of the 
Omaha Plant. 
I ·said: "You are also going to pay me a lot 
of bonus too." 
He said: "We have got money to pay the 
bonus, you sell the feed .. " 
Then we left the room and started down-
stairs. 
Q. Who left the room~ 
A. Mr. Borsum, Mr. Williams and myself left 
the room to go downstairs. 
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I said: "Bill, it will take a lot of feed, and I 
will get a lot of bonus, it is pretty near time 
to shut off out there." 
He said : "We will take care of you, Kellogg 
has got plenty of money and we will make the 
feed." (R. 26). 
Mrs. Hele,n L. Scoville testified with respect to such con-
versation as follows: 
R. 79: 
Q. You heard your husband testify to a con-
versation which took place in your hotel room 
at the Fontenell Hotel in Omaha, Nebraska? 
A. Yes. 
Q. April16, 1949? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Were you present? 
A. I was. 
Q. Who else was present? 
A. Mr. Borswn, Mr. Williams and Mr. Scoville. 
Q. Was anything else said at that time regarding 
bonus, or amount of feed to be sold in this 
territory? Answe·r "yes" or "no." 
A. Yes. 
Q. Who said it? 
A. Mr. 'Scoville asked -
MR. AADNESEN: The record still shows 
my objection' 
THE COURT: Yes. 
A. Mr. Scoville said that the amount of contracts 
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he had \Yritten would be between four hun-
dred thousand and four hundred fifty thou-
sand turkeys, and he suggested they not take 
any more contracts and Mr. Williams said 
they \Yere ''feed hungry," and they wonld 
continue to take contracts as long as they 
were justified. Mr. Scoville reminded hiin 
again that $2.00 bonus was still in effect, and 
there was never anything contrary said to 
that. (R. 79). 
In Parker vs. Webber County Irrigation Distri_ct, 
1925, 65 Utah 354 236 Pac. 1105, an employee· brought an 
action on a written contract of employment to recover 
for the employee's services .. The employer offered to 
prove that the terms of the contract respecting the date 
it should become effective were modified by mutual 
agreement between the employee and the employer. The 
trial court rejected the p·roferred evidence upon the 
ground that the modification is made on the same day 
that the contract is dated and ruled that if the evidence 
were admitted, it would, in effect, vary the terms of the 
written instrument by parol evidence. Up.on appeal it was 
held by this Honorable Court that a written instrument 
may be modified at anytime after the execution of that 
written instrument. The court stating that the time inter-
vening between the execution of the instrument and its 
modification is not controlling. It is the intention of the 
parties to modify the agreement in some particular that 
controls. 
In Hogan vs. Swayze, 1925, 65 Utah 380, 237 Pac. 
1097 at page 389, the court said: 
It may be said in passing, howeve-r, that the 
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rule that parol evidence is inadmissible to vary 
the terms of a plain, unambiguous instrument, in 
writing, is elementary in this and every other 
jurisdiction of the country. Consequently it is not 
necessary to cite the authorities relied on by ap-
pellants. Such authorities apply only to prior or 
contemporaneous agreements, and not to agree-
ments subsequently made. Prior or contemporan-
eous agreements are held to be merged in the 
written contract, and therefore not admissible 
in evidence. 
In 32 C.J.S., Section 1004, at page 1008, the rule 
is stated as follows : 
The rule forbidding the admission of parol or 
extrinsic evidence to alter, vary, or contradict 
a written instrument does not apply so as to pro-
hibit the establishment by parol of an agreement 
between the parties to a writing, entered into sub-
sequent to the time when the written instrument 
was executed, notwithstanding such agreement 
may have the effect of adding to, changing, modi-
fying, or even altogether abrogating the contract 
of the parties as evidenced by the writing; for 
the parol evidence does not in any way deny 
that the orginal agreement of the parties was that 
which the writing purports to express, but merely 
goes to show that the parties have exercised their 
right to change or abrogate the same, or to make 
a new and independent contract. It must appear, 
however, that there was a subsequent agreement, 
mere negotiations or representations being in-
sufficient; and it is usually necessary· that such 
subsequent agreement be founded on a considera-
tion, although a contrary view has been asse·rted. 
Where the statutes p-rohibit, as they do in some 
jurisdictions, the alteration of a written contract 
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by a subsequent unexecuted parol agree1nent, such 
an agreen1ent cannot of course be shown. flow-
ever, proof of alteration by. an executed oral 
agreement is usually per1nitted under such stat-
utes: and such a statute has been held inapplicable 
to an entirely ne\Y agreement Yalid in itself. While 
parol evidence of a subsequent agreement between 
the parties on a point not covered by the original 
contract is admissible, such evidence is inadmiss-
ible for the purpose of explaining or interpreting 
an unainbiguou~ 'Yritten contract. 
By inference fro1n the last paragraph in Bulletin 
148-3, Exhibit A for Mr. Scoville, the rate used in com-
puting the bonus for 1948 would either cease and deter-
mine as of the end of the year 1948; continue for the 
year 1949 at the same rate, or a new rate would be deter-
mined and used in computing a 1949 bonus. The only 
inference which may be drawn from the conversations 
which were objected to by the Company are that there 
would be a bonus for the year 1949 and that such bonus 
would be computed at the rate of $2.00 per ton of feed 
sold as which is the same rate provided in the agreement 
of 1948. 
If the view is taken that the 1948 bonus plan ceased 
and determined at the end of the year 1948, then such 
conversations would establish a new oral agreement p.ro-
viding for a bonus at the rate of $2.00 per ton for the 
year 1949. This in effect would be entering into a new 
bonus contract and admission of the testimony would be 
permissible under the Parol Evidence Rule. 
If the view is taken that the conversations extended 
the 1948 agreement to include the year 1949, then such 
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parol e.vidence would be an oral modification of a prior 
written agreement. Parol evidence of an oral modifica-
tion of a prior written agreement is admissible under the 
Parol Evidence! Rule. 
If the view is taken that such conversations indicated 
that the Company had taken a look at the situation at the 
end of 1948 and determined that the $2.00 bonus "is the 
best possible bonus arrangement, both from the stand-
point of the individual salesmen and the Kellogg Com-
pany," then such conversations are completely in accord 
with the writing referred to as Bulletin 148-3, and such 
testimony is not subject to objection upon the ground 
that it violates the Parol Evidence Rule in that such is 
entirely consistent with the writing and does not alter, 
vary or contradict the writing, and consequently is 
admissible. 
The conversations objected to and stricken did not 
alter, did not vary, and did not contradict the written 
instrument. Such conversations either formed a subse-
quent new agre·ement, modified_ the old agreement, or 
were in complete conformity with the written instrument. 
POINT II 
PAROL EVIDENCE TO PROVE A PRIOR ORAL AGREE-
MENT DIFFERENT IN ITS TERMS FROM A PURPORTED 
WRITTEN AGREEMENT IS ADMISSIBLE AND THE TRIAL 
COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING TESTIMONY ADDUCED 
TO PROVE THE VERBAL AGREEMENT DIFFERENT IN 
ITS TERMS FROM THE PURPORTED WRITTEN AGREE-
MENT, WHICH WAS NEVER ASSENTED TO. 
Mr. 'Scoville offered certain parol evidence of an 
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oral agreement for the payu1ent of a bonus in the year 
1949. The conYersations out of \vhich. such oral agree-
Inent arose took place in 1948 and April of 19-!!J. There 
is also a presumption in la\v that an i1nplied agreement 
as to the payment of a bonus at the rate clai1ned by l\1r. 
Scoville arose. ..A. W'Titing was introduced in evidence 
\Yhich \vas subsequent to the conversations and the im-
plied agreement, \Yhich writing the Company contended 
\\~as a written agreen1ent which could not be modified 
by parol evidence. 
There was no evidence from which it could be found 
as a matter of law that Mr. Scoville gave his assent to 
the written instrument as being the agreement of the par-
ties. l\lr. Scoville contested the written instrument as 
not being the agreement of the parties. The trial court 
granted the Company's motion to strike the parol evi-
dence of the oral agreement on the ground that it was 
an attempt to alter or vary the terms of the 1949 writing. 
The trial court erred in granting such motion as 
the writing was not admitted to be the agreement of the 
parties and parol evidence is admissible to show that a 
different agreem·ent existed and the writing was not as-
sented to as being the agreement of the parties. 
The Bulletin numbered 148-3, dated January 29, 
1948, set out under Point I, supra, which established 
a 1948 bonus plan, was such that it might be inferred 
that the rate used in computing the bonus for 1948 would 
either cease and det·ermine as of the end of the year 1948, 
continue for the year 1949 at the same rate, or that the 
Company would determine a new rate to be used in com-
puting a 1949 bonus. 
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The conversation that took place on November 4·., 
1948 between Mr. Scoville, Mr. Borsum and Mrs. Helen 
L. Scoville, was such that a reasonable inference that 
might be drawn therefrom is that a bonus plan would be 
established providing the same bonus for the year 1949 
as was used to compute the bonus for 1948. The testi-
mony as to this conversation is set out under Point I, 
supra. 
The conversation which took place on April16, 1949, 
the testimony as to which is set out under Point I, is 
such that a reasonable inference that might be drawn was 
that a definite offer of $2.00 a ton bonus for the year 1949 
to be computed at $2.00 a ton which was the same rate as 
the 1948 bonus was computed at, was made by Mr. W. 
H. Williams at that time, and the conversation and the 
conduct of the parties was such that there was an accept-
ance of such offer out of which a contract or ·an agree-
ment of emplo;yment with a bonus at the rate of $2.00 
a ton arose. 
During the last part of July or early August of 
1949, Mr. Scoville received a writing which is captioned 
"Bonus Plan For 1949" and which was admitted as Mr. 
Scoville's Exhibit 3 at R~. 20, se:tting out certain figures 
to be paid as a bonus on sales for the year 1949. This 
was the first written notice received by Mr. Scoville 
which indicated that the figures to be used by the· Com-
pany in computing the 1949 bonus would be different 
than that used to eompute the 1948 bonus (R. 19). 
Mr. Scoville protested seve~ral times, orally, to Mr. 
Williams (R. 28) concerning this writing and to Mr. 
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Borsun1 (R. 72). On January 9, 1950, Mr. Williams, Mr. 
Borslm1 and ~lr. Scoville attended the turkey show in 
~Iinneapolis, l\linnesota (R. 28). At this time Mr. Bor-
sum told Mr. Scoville that if he, Mr. Scoville, took it up 
with the higher-ups, ~fr. Borstun, Mr. Williams and Mr. 
Scoville ""'ould all lose their jobs. That if Mr. Scoville 
would keep his n1outh shut, Mr. 'Scoville could stay on 
indefinitely as long as he was doing the job (R. 29). 
l\lr. Scoville felt that he was too old a man to lose the job 
and have to go out and hunt for a new one (R. 71). 
On February 3, 1950, Mr. Scoville became ill (R. 
56). He left Billings, Montana, and went to Phoenix, 
Arizona, as prescribed by a doctor (R. 68). He remained 
in Phoenix, Arizon~ until April1, 1950 (R. 68) at which 
time he returned to Utah and his employment (R. 56). 
On December 30, 1950, Mr. Scoville wrote to Mr. 
Lyle C. Roll, protesting the handling of the bonus for 
194-9. Letter admitted as Company's Exhibit 12 at R. 
67. 
On January 27, 1951, Mr. Scoville again wrote to l\Ir. 
Roll, protesting the handling of the 1949 bonus ~d deny-
ing that the signing of checks p·aid by the Comp·any was 
an acceptance of the settlement of his claim (letter ad-
mitted as the Company's Exhibit 13 at R. 68). In spite 
of the above protest and the evidence of an oral agree-
ment for the year 1949, the honorable trial judge granted 
the Company's motion to strike the testimony as to the 
conversations which took place in 1948 and 1949. 
In Goldsteim vs. Robert Dollar Company, S·up.reme 
Court of Oregon 1928, 270 Pac. 903, 127 Ore. 29, the ship-
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per of an automobile made arrangements with the carrier 
for the shipment of his automobile. These arrangements 
were made orally. Subsequent to these oral arrangements 
for the shipment of the automobile the carrier issued a 
bill of lading which was received by the shipper without 
objection. The shipper's automobile was damaged while 
in the possession of the carrier. The shipper brought 
th~s action on an oral contract, attempting to establish 
the liability of the carrier on a basis of the oral contract. 
The case went to the jury which returned a verdict for 
the shipper. The trial court granted a new trial on the 
ground that the trial court should have instructed the 
jury that the bill of lading as issued by the carrier was 
the contract. The shipper appealed and on. appeal it 
was held that the question of assent to the bill of lading 
by the shipper was a question of fact for the jury. The 
shipper was entitled to submit to the jury his theory 
of the case on the ground that the assent to the bill of 
lading is a question of fact and the oral contract which 
might have arisen prior to the bill of lading was also a 
question of fact. The court observed that had the oral 
contract been made contemporaneously with the written 
bill of lading the parol evidence would be inadmissible. 
In Bruce vs. Snow, 18 N. H. 514, it was held that 
parol evidence is admissible only when the writing has 
been approved to be the agreement of the parties, and 
in Haag vs. Owen, 57 N. Y. 644, it was held that where 
the writing is in dispute, oral evidence is admissible to 
show an oral agreement different than the writing. 
The editors of Corpus Juris Secundwn have stated 
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the rule as follo,Ys in 3~ C.J.S., Section 967 at Page 932: 
The rule 'vhich exeludes parol evidence to 
contradict or vary the terms of a 'vritten agree-
Inent ean be applied only when a 'vritten agre-e-
nlent is proved to exist between the parties, and 
consequently parol evidence is admissible to sho'v 
that a 'vriting, although purporting on its face to 
be a contract, 'Yas not in fact intended by the par-
ties to be such. Furthermore, 'vhere a paper set 
up as an agreement is not admitted to be such 
by the party sought to be affected by it and there 
is a conflict of evidence on the question whether 
it is such agreen1ent or not, the court will not ex-
clude testin1ony adduced to prove a verbal agree-
Inent differing in its terms from the written one, 
but 'vill merely direct the jury to disregard such 
testimon~- in case they find the 'vriting to be the 
agreement of the parties. 
Mr. Scoville is also aided by an implied contract 
that the bonus for 1949 would be computed at the same 
rate as the bonus for 1948 was computed. 
In Holton vs. Hart Mill Co., Sup. Ct. of Wash. 1946, 
166 Pac. 2d 186, an employee- brought an action to re-
cover damages for a breach of contract for personal serv-
ices. From a judgment in the employee's favor, the ein-
.ployer appealed. The contract was based upon a letter 
written by the employer to the effect that he would under-
take to keep the payroll records of the emplo~er for a 
period of one year at a flat fee of $2,100.00. The em-
ployer answered by way of a letter stating that the em-
ployment for a period of one year at a flat fee of $2,100.-
00 would be agreeable. The employee performed the 
services for the period of one year and continued with 
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the work after·the expiration of the initial year. After 
expiration of the initial year provided for by the letters, 
the employer told the employee to "stay and continue as 
theretofore" after which the employee continued with the 
work. The trial court found that the contract established 
by the letters was renewed. The employer appealed and 
the ·supreme Court of Washington held that the finding 
of the trial court was warranted in fact and in law. The 
Supreme Court stating at page 187, "furthermore where 
a contract of employment for a definite term expir.es and 
the employee continues to render the same services, the 
presumption is that he is serving under a new contract 
having the same terms and conditions." 
In 56 C.J.S., Section 10 at J?age 82, the editors have 
stated the rule as follows : 
As a general rUle, sometimes by virtue of 
statutory provisions, where one enters into the 
service of another for a definite period, and con-
tinues in the employment after the expiration of 
that period, without any new contract, the pre-
sumption is that the employment is continued on 
the terms of the original con tract, and provisions 
and restrictions forming essential parts of the 
contract, although collateral to the employment 
itself, continue in force. A change in one of the 
terms does not destroy the presumption as to the 
other terms. Thus, a mere. change in the contract 
with respect to the amount of salary will not affect 
the applicability of the rule. 
While it has been held that, where the original 
term is for more than a year, a continuance in em-
ployment will not support a presumption of a 
renewal for the full period of the original term, 
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but only of en1ployu1ent fro1n year to year there-
after, \Yhere the hiring is for a definite ter111 less 
than a year, it has been held that a renewal for 
that tern1 "'"ill be in1plied, but there is authority 
to the rontrary. lTnless the original contract 'vas 
for an entire year and the service rendered under 
it rontinued for at least a year, no presumption of 
rene""'al for another year on the same terms arises 
by reason of continuance in. the same service. 
It has been ~eld, however, that the presump-
tion """ill not arise where the original contract is . 
absolutely void, or where the services rendered 
after the expiration of the tern1 are of a different 
character from that called for by the contract, 
and it may be rebutted by showing a new agre·e-
ment or that a different hiring was in fact intend-
ed by the parties. A new contract may arise, al-
though it is shown under an agreement which is 
in tern1s an express renewal of the original con-
tract. Also, when, at the close of a definite term, 
negotiations are pending for a new contract, it 
has been held that the law will not conclude them 
by a presumption of an implied contract, and 
when such negotiations have been in fact con-
cluded by the parties, and a new arrangeme,nt 
agreed on, it is immaterial that, although con-
templated, the new agre·ement has. not been re-
duced to writing. 
Rights and obligations under former contract. 
Where separate. and independent contracts 
of employment for successive p·eriods of time con-
tain no statement of a settlement of prior dealing 
with the parties, there is no presumption that 
their mutual claims up. to the date of making a 
contract had been adjusted. 
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In Otten vs. San Francisco Hotel Owners Associa-
tion, et al, District Court of Appeals of California, 1946, 
168 Pac. 2d 739, the court observes the codification of a 
common law rule in the State of California. In this case 
recovery is not allowed as the plaintiff in the action was 
found to he ari independent contractor and not a servant. 
The conversations of Mr. Scoville and representa-
tives of the Company as set out supra under Point I, is 
consistent with and gives weight to an agreement provid-
ing for the 1949 bonus. A contract for a bonus for the 
year 1949 having been entered into by Mr. S.coville 
and the Company, the Company attempts to make a writ-
ing; delivers it to Mr. Scoville; contends that the writing 
is the agreement and then proceeds to exclude any· evi-
dence of any other agreement which arose p-revious there-
to on the ground that the writing is the agreement. In 
order that this agreement be taken as the agreement be-
tween the parties, the Company has the burden of prov-
ing that it was an acceptance. The only infe-rence that 
can be drawn from the earlier conversation is that there 
was no acceptance of the: 1949 writing. 
There is substantial evidence that there was a con-
tract prior to the 1949 writing and there is substantial 
evidence in the record that the 1949 writing was never 
accepted. Mere continuation in the employment of the 
Company does. not constitute an acceptance: and mere de·-
lay in this case does noit constitute an acceptance. There 
is considerable evidence in the record explaining the 
reason for the delays and protests. There is also evidence 
. in the record that states oral protests were made to rep-
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resentatives of the C~on1pany. The only evidence of delay 
and protest to representatives in the Company is that the 
delay 'Yas with respect to those representatives of the 
Co1npany higher in the hierarchy of the Company, which 
delay is explained by 1\Ir. Scoville's fea.r of losing his 
job. 
The court erred in striking this evidence as being 
in violation of the Parol Evidence Rule. ParoJ evidence . 
of a prior existing, oral agreement is admissible when a 
writing purported to be the agreement is contested by . 
the person showing the prior oral agreement. The case 
should have gone to the jury. The jury should have been 
instructed that in event the jury found that there had 
~ 
been an assent to the writing, then the jury was to dis-
regard the parol evidence as to the oral agreement. On 
the other hand, if the jury chose to believe that there 
was a prior -existing oral agreement and there was no 
assent to the writing and the writing did not become a 
binding agreement between the parties, then the jury was 
to disregard the writing. 
POINT III 
THE TESTIMONY OF MR. SCOVILLE WAS TO . THE 
EFFECT THAT L. C. BORSUM WAS THE SALES MANAGER 
FOR THE ENTIRE UNITED STATES OF THE KELLOGG· 
SALES· COMPANY. CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE 
SAID MR. SCOVILLE AND THE SAID L. C .. BORSUM 
TENDED TO ESTABLISH THE RELATIONSHIP OF' A 
SALESMAN AND HIS SUPERIOR IN THE SAME ORGANI-
ZATION, AND THE DOCUMENTA~Y EVIDENCE INTRO-
DUCED AT TRIAL WAS CONSISTENT WITH AND TENDED 
TO ESTABLISH THE SAME FACTS AS TESTIFIED TO BY 
MR. SCOVILLE. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN STRIKING 
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SUCH TESTIMONY ON THE GROUNDS THAT SUCH WAS 
NOT BINDING UPON THE KELLOGG SALES COMPANY. 
The testimony of Mr. Scoville established that Mr. 
Leslie Carl Borsum was the Sales Manager for the 
United States for.the Kellogg Sales Company and that 
he had authority to bind the Kellogg ·sales Company dur~ 
ing the dates in question~ Certain of the exhibits ad-
mitted in evidence tend to esta'blish that Mr. Borsum 
was an employee of the Kellogg Sales Company and had 
authority to bind the Kellogg Sales Company. The only 
evidence of other employment is the testimony of ~r. 
Borsum that ·a.t the time of trial he was employed by the 
Kellogg Company. This is not conflicting with the testi-
mony of Mr. Scoville. There was no evidence that during 
the dates in question in this action, Mr. Borsum was· 
not employed by the Kellogg Sales Comp·any or that he 
did not have authority to bind the Kellogg Sales Com-
pany at the times of the conversations in question. 
The trial court erred in striking the testimony as to 
the conversations had by Mr. Scoville with Mr. Borsum. 
Mr. Scoville testified that Mr. Leslie Carl Borsum 
·is the Sales Manager for the United States for the Kel~ 
logg Sales Company (R. 21). On voir dire examination 
Mr. Scoville testified that Mr. Borsum was the Sales 
M·anager of the Kellogg Sales Company and that he knew 
such of his own knowledge~ On cross examination, Mr. 
Scoville testified that he knew there were two companies, 
that is, the Kellogg Company and the Kellogg ~sales 
Company ·(R. 30). 
On examination of Mr. Borsum, the testimony was as 
follows: 
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R. 83, S-l: 
DIRECT EX_A_MINATION. 
Bl~ ~iR. CALLISTER: 
Q. ~Ir. Borsum, "Till you state your name, 
please)? 
.. A_. Leslie Carl Borsum. 
Q. ''-r-here do you reside:~ 
~\. Battle . Creek, !\Iichigan. 
Q. By whom are you employed~ 
_._\. By the l{ellogg Company. 
Q. Now, l\Ir. Borsum, how much was paid to Mr. 
Scoville, if you recall offhand for the year 
1949 in the way of bonus~ 
A. I can't recall offhand the exact amount with-
out looking at the checks he was paid in ac-
cordance with the 1949 bonus plan. 
Q. That is what I want to know. In other words, 
. he was paid according to the terms of Exhibit 
B," was he not~ 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. His tonnage was computed and then applied 
to this schedule set out in Exhibit B, and he 
was paid accordingly, is that not correct~ 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. So that you figured all that Mr. Scoville had 
coming to him was what you p·aid him under · 
this~ · · 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. MR. CALLIS·TER: That is all. 
MR. AADNE,SEN: No questions. (R. 84) 
The writing captioned "Bonus Plan for 1949" intro~ 
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duced and admitted as Mr. Scoville's Exhibit B at R. 
20, was signed by Mr. Leslie Carl Borsum. 
The letter da:ted Ap.ril 25, 1950, from Mr. Borsum 
to Mr. Scoville, transmitting the check in the sum of 
$1,026.88, (Company's Exhibit 8 admitted at R. 5) repre-
senting the balance due Mr. Scoville on the 1949 bonus as 
computed by the Company under the 1949 writing was 
signed by Mr. Borsum. (See R. 51, as to stipulation of 
signature). 
The letter dated July 24, 1949 to Mr. L. C. Borsum 
from Mr. 'Scoville, (admitted as the Company's Exhibit 
10 at R. 61), was addressed to Mr. L. C. Borsum, Kellogg 
Sales Company, Battle Creek, Michigan. 
A letter dated August 2, 1949 to Mr. Scoville (ad-
mitted as the Company's· Exhibit 11 at R. 65) which was 
from Mr. L. C. Borsum (R. 64) contained the following 
p-aragraph which appeare:d as the last paragraph therein: 
"We are_ having a sales meeting in Omaha on 
August 8 and 9, and I think that you should be 
there at that time. Will be looking forward to 
seeing you." · 
The Company, through counsel, objected to the testi~ 
mony of the conversations had with Mr. Borsum on the, 
ground that the testimony with respect to such conversa-
tions would be an attempt to bind the Kellogg Sales Com-
pany by a statement of the Kellogg Company (R. 23). 
The Company objected to such conversations on the 
ground that it is an attempt to bind the employee of one 
organization against another· (R. 25). These objections 
were renewed and app-ear elsewhere in the record. The 
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Honorable Trial Judge granted the Company's Inotion 
to strike such testin1ony on the grounds as stated. . 
The testimony of :J[r. Scoville establishe'd that Mr. 
Le~lie Carl Borsum is the Sales ~Ianager for the United 
States for .the I~ellogg Sales Con1pany. The conversa-
tions by their very nature, by inference, tend to establish 
the position and the authority of Mr. Borsum to bind the 
Kellogg Sales Co1npany. The writing captioned "Bonus 
Plan for 1949" was signed "L. C. Borsum." This is the 
very writing by '\vhich the Company attempted to bind 
~Ir. Scoville and the Kellogg Sales Company. This writ-
ing '\vas received subsequent to any conversations had by 
Mr. Scoville and Mr. Borsum. If the view is taken that 
Mr. Borsum did not have authority to bind the Kellogg 
Sales Company, then he certainly had no authority by 
which to establish the 1949 writing as an agreement be-
tween the Company and Mr. Scoville. 
The letter dated April 25, 1950, enclosing the check 
in the sum of $1,026.88, which represented the balance 
due, computed at the rate contended for by the Kellogg 
Sales Company, was signed by Mr. Borsum. At the time 
of trial, in answer to the question "so that you figured 
all that Mr. ScoiVille had coming to him was ·what you 
paid him_under this~", Mr. Borsum answered "Yes sir.'' 
The only inferences that can be drawn from this question 
and answer is that Mr. Borsum was an employee of the 
Kellogg Sales Company; that he figured the amount of 
the bonus at the rate contended for by the Kellogg Sale.s 
Company and p,aid Mr. Scoville; that Mr~ Borsum was 
an employee of the Kellogg 'Sales Company. 
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All of the evidence that was adduced at the trial 
was consistent with the testimony of Mr. Scoville that 
Mr. Borsum was the Sales Manager of the entire United 
States for the Kellogg Sales Company. There were no 
inconsistencies. The only statement made that Mr. Bor-
sum was an employe:e of someone other than the Kellogg 
Sales Company was the statement of Mr. Borsum that at 
the time of the trial he was employed by the Kellogg 
Company, which is not inconsistent with prior employ-
ment with the Kellogg Sales Comp·any. 
By inference Mr. Borsum had authority to set bonus 
plans as per the writing captioned· "Bonus Plan for 
1949," ('Scoville's Exhibit B, admitted at R. 20). By in-
ference Mr. Borsum had authority to require the at~end­
ance of Mr. Sco:ville at sales meetings as p·er the letter of 
August 2, 1949, (Comp·any's Exhrbit 11) and by inference 
Mr. Borsum had authority to make payments of wages 
to ·Mr. Scoville as per the letter dated April 25, 1950. 
The trial court erred in striking the testimony with 
regard to conversations had betwe.en Mr. Scoville and 
· Mr. L. C. Borswn. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DIRECTING A VER-
DICT FOR THE COMPANY AFTER WRONGLY EXCLUDED 
TESTIMONY WHICH TENDED TO ESTABLISH THE CASE 
FOR MR. SCOVILLE. 
Mr. Scoville's testimony as to conversations with 
Mr. Williams and Mr. Borsum· was substantial evidence 
establishing his ease· for recovery of the balance due as 
his bonus for the year 1949. The trial court was in error 
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as sho,vn under Points I, II and III in exeluding the con-
yer~a.tions \Yith :\lr. Borsum. The court erred as shown 
under Points I and II in excluding the testimony of Mr. 
Sroville as to his conversation \Yith l\fr. Williams. These 
c.onversa tions created a bonus plan for 1949. The~ estab-
lished the rate of such bonus to be $2.00 per ton of feed 
sold. If such conversations had been considered and ap-
plied in the n1ost favorable light to the plaintiff's cause 
of action, the court could not have directed a verdict for 
the Company. The trial court erred in directing a ver-
dict. 
The rule is followed in this state that where defend-
ant moves for a directed verdict, the evidence must be 
considered and applied in the most favorable light to the 
plaintiff's cause of action. Groesbeck vs. Lake Side 
Printing Company, Sup. Ct. of Utah, 1919, 55 Utah 335, 
186 Pac. 103. In applying this rule the court must (1) 
take all facts proved by the evidence; (2) take all facts 
tended to be proved by the evidence ; and ( 3) draw all 
inferences from the evidence for the plaintiff. 
It is also a well established rule in this state that 
where there is any substantial evidence upon which the 
jury could find for the plaintiff under the pleadings, 
the trial court must submit the issues to the jury and can-
not direct a verdict. A. W. Sewell Comparny vs. Com-
mercial Casualty Company, Sup. Ct. of Utah 1932, 15 
Pac. 2d 327. 
As shown in Points I, II and III the testimony as to 
conversations in question should have been admitted in 
evidence. . 
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The only inferences which may be drawn from .the 
conversation which took place on N oventber 4,- 1948 be-
tween Mr. Scoville and Mr. Borsum as set out under 
Point I, supra, is that there would be a bonus for the 
year 1949; that such bonus would be at the rate of $2.00 
per ton o~ feed sold of the same type as that described 
in Bulletin 148-3 as set out under Point I, supra. 
Mr. Scoville testified with respect to the conversa-
tion which took place on April16, 1949, as foilows: 
R. 25, 26: 
A. I asked both Mr. Borsum and Mr. Williams 
if they thought I had about enough turkey 
contracts in this teTritory. 
And Mr. Williams stated I should go ahead 
and sell all the contracts I could. He could 
make the feed. He was in charge ·of the 
Omaha Plant. 
I said: "You are also going to pay me a lot 
of bonus too." 
He said: "We have got money to pay the 
bon us, you sell the feed." 
Then we left the room and started down-
stairs. 
Q. Who left the room~ 
A. Mr. Borsum, Mr. Williams and myself left 
the room to go downstairs. 
I said : "Bill, it will take a lot of feed, and I 
will get a lot of bonus, it is pretty near time 
to shut off out there.'' 
He said : "We will take care of you, Kellogg 
has got plenty of money and we will make the 
feed." (R. 26). 
38 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Mrs. Scoville testified \vith re~pect to the conver~ 
sation which took place on April 16, 1949 as follo\vs: 
R. 79: 
1lr. Scoville, said that the ainotmt of con-
tracts he had \Yritten would be bet\veen four hun-
dred thousand and four hundred fifty thousand 
turkeys~ and he suggested they not take-any more 
contracts and ~Ir. vVillia1ns ·said they were "feed 
htmgry,"' and they would continue to take con-
tracts as long as they were justified. Mr. Sco-
ville re1ninded hin1 again that $2.00 bonus was still 
in effect, and there was never anything contrary 
said to that. ( R. 79). 
The only inference which can be drawn from this ·con-
versation is that the 1949 bonus would be comp·ute.d at the 
rate of $2.00 per ton of feed sold. An acceptance of this 
arrangement can be found in the continuation of sales 
by Mr. Scoville during the year 1949. 
It must also be noted that Mr. Scoville's cause is aid-
ed by a presumption that in continuing in t~e service of 
the Company, the terms of his employment would be the. 
same for the year 1949 as they·were for the year 1948. 
· ·Holton vs. Hart Mill Co., cited supra, Sup. Ct. of Wash., 
1946, 166 Pac. 2d 186. 
During the last part of July or early part of August, 
Mr. Scoville received a writing which is captioned "Bonus 
Plan for 1949" (and which was admitted as Mr. Sco-
ville's Exhibit B) (R. 20) setting out certain figures to be 
paid as a bonus on sales for the year 1949. This was 
the first written notice received by Mr. Sco~le which in-
dicated that the figures to be used by the Company in 
computing. the 1949 bonus would be different than that 
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used to computed the 1948 bonus (R. 19). Mr. Scoville· 
protested several times orally to Mr. Williams and Mr. 
Borsum about the writing which he received as setting 
out figures to be used by the Company in computing the 
1949 bonus (R. 72, R. 28). Mr. Sco;ville's fear of losing 
his job explains the manner in which he conducted his 
protest about the 1949 writing. He felt that he was too 
old a man to lose the job and have to go out a!ld hunt 
for a new one (R. 71). 
The facts as recited above would support a verdict 
that an oral agreement providing for a $2.00 a ton bonus 
for the year 1949 was entered into. The evidence intro-
duced at the trial would support a verdict by the jury that 
there was no assent to the 1949 writing captioned "Bonus 
Plan for 1949.". Such evidence being substantial and 
such that it would have supported a verdict. 
The trial court erred in directing a verdict for the 
Company. 
CONCLUSION 
The Comp:any's Bulletin numbered 148-3, dated 
January 29, 1948, established a bonus plan for the year 
1948. Parol evidence was offered which tended to estab-
lish a subsequent oral agreement to the 1948 bonus plan 
under which Mr. Scoville would be entitled to a $2.00 
per ton bonus for feed sold for the Company during the 
year 1949, this parol evidence was stricken on the 
grounds that it was a variation. or alteration of the 1948 
Bulletin 148-3. The trial court erred in striking such 
evidence in that it is permissible to modify a prior writ-
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ten agreen1ent by parol or to enter into a subsequent oral 
agree1nent regarding the same subject n1atter but as to a 
different period of time. 
The trial court also erred in striking parol evidence 
to prove a prior oral agreen1ent w'"hich was different from 
the terms of a purported "'"ritten agreement, which writ-
ing was contested as not being· the written agreement 
of the parties. There was substantial evidence to estab-
lish that there W'"as no assent to the purported written 
agreement, i.e., the 1949 writing captioned "Bonus Plan 
for 1949." It is not in violation of the Parol Evidence 
Rule to allow parol evidence of a prior oral agreement 
where the instrument contended to be the written agree-
ment is contested and there is evidence that there was 
no assent to such writing; the Parol Evidence Rule, pre-
suming the existence of a written agreement. In this 
case the writing is contested as being a written agree-
ment. 
The trial court erred in striking the testimony of Mr. 
L. C. Borsum on the grounds that Mr. Borsum was not 
an employee of the Kellogg Sales Company but of the 
Kellogg Company. The only evidence being to the effect 
that dll!ing the times in question, Mr. L. C. Borsum was 
an employee of the Kellogg Sales Company. The only 
evidence of any other employment was that Mr. Borsum 
was an emplo~ee of the Kellogg Company at the time of 
trial. 
The evidence, having been stricken, was not consider-
ed by the Trial Judge in directing a verdict. Had the 
Trial Judge considered such evidence, he would not have 
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been able to direct a verdict under the rules followed 
in Utah in directing a verdict. 
It can be seen that Mr. Scoville was denied the con-
sideration of that evidence which should have been con-
sidered by the Trial Judge in directing a verdict. It is 
also quite evident that Mr. Scoville was deprived of his 
right to have all of his evidence considered by the jury. 
Mr. Scoville's theory of the case was not at anytime con-
sidered by/ the Trial Judge nor was it allowed to go to 
the jury. There is substantial evidence in the record to 
support the theory of Mr. Scoville's case. Having been 
de·prived of the consideration of his theory and the con-
sideration of the evidence in support of his theory he 
has been precluded from obtaining the consideration of 
his recovery of a bonus on sales, which when computed 
upon the basis of the tonnages stipulated to by counsel 
(R. 12) as shown by the amended complaint (R. 1) would 
amount to the sum of $16,183.53. 
It is respectfully submitted that the testimony of 
conversations with Mr. Borsum and Mr. Williams should 
not have been stricken. That the trial court erred in di-
recting a verdict; that the trial court should be reversed 
and the case remanded with instructions for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER, JR. 
REESE C. ANDER·SON 
Attorneys. for .A.p·pellant 
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